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Abstract: Ad-Hoc networks are decentralized wireless networks. A fundamental problem in 
Ad-Hoc networks is finding a secure and correct route between a source and a destination 
efficiently. The need for scalable and energy efficient routing protocols, along with the 
availability of small, inexpensive and low power positioning instruments, results in making 
position-based routing protocols a promising choice for mobile Ad-Hoc networks. This 
paper presents an extensive overview of the existing Ad-Hoc unicast routing protocols that 
make forwarding decisions based on the geographical position of the destination of a 
packet, while keeping security issues in mind. We outline the main problems for this class of 
routing protocols and a qualitative comparison of the existing protocols is done in regards 
to both security and performance issues. We conclude our work by investigating some 
future research opportunities. 
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1 Introduction 
An Ad-Hoc network is considered as a very particular network since it is a self-
organizing network with no pre-deployed infrastructure and no centralized control; 
instead, nodes carry out basic networking functions like routing. With this 
flexibility, Ad-Hoc networks have the ability to be formed anywhere and at any 
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time. In addition to traditional uses such as for military battlefields, these networks 
are being increasingly used in every-day applications, such as in conferences, 
personal area networking and meetings. 
Routing protocol in Ad-Hoc networks is a fundamental part of the network 
infrastructure that supports the delivery of packets. It is a challenging task, as it 
has to face the challenge of link instability, frequently changing topology, the 
absence of a fixed infrastructure and low transmission power. Also, owing to 
differences in transmission capacity, some of the links may be unidirectional, 
which leads to the existence of asymmetric links. 
All nodes in the network act as routers; hence security in routing protocols is 
necessary to guard against attacks, such as eavesdropping, spoofing, misdirection 
and the generating of deceptive routing messages. Moreover, wireless networks 
are generally more susceptible to physical security risks than wired networks. 
Therefore, routing in Ad-Hoc networks is a difficult task to accomplish efficiently, 
robustly and securely. 
Several routing protocols have been proposed for Ad-Hoc networks. In general, 
they can be divided into two main categories: topology-based and position-based. 
Topology-based routing protocols use information about links that exist in the 
network to perform packet forwarding. However, position-based routing protocols 
use the nodes‟ geographical positions to make routing decisions, which improves 
performance and efficiency. 
Although topology-based routing protocols (such as DSR [8] and AODV [7]) 
represent important steps in Ad-Hoc routing research area, some of these are not 
scalable and still exhibit security vulnerabilities. Even secure ones (such as 
SAODV [12], ARIADNE [37] and ARAN [22]) have some problems, such as single 
point of attack and failure, increased packet and processing overhead, as well as 
delays in the route discovery process. These problems become worse if these 
protocols are implemented in large networks since any request packet is flooded to 
the entire network. 
Position-based Ad-Hoc routing protocols have proved to have better performance 
than traditional topology-based ones in end-to-end throughput and network 
scalability. Many position-based routing protocols have been proposed for Ad-
Hoc networks such as MFR [16], DIR [11], GPSR [5], ARP [32], I-PBBLR [34] 
DREAM [28], LAR [38], LARWB [30], LABAR [13], GRID [33] and 
TERMINODES [23]. Although each of these protocols employs different 
techniques the basic goal is the same: only nodes making forward progress toward 
the destination are supposed to be involved in the route discovery process in an 
attempt to decrease the overall routing overhead. 
These protocols require that a node be able to obtain its own, as well as the 
destination‟s geographical position. Generally, this information is obtained via 
Global Positioning System (GPS) and location services. The routing decision at 
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each node is then based on the destination's position contained in the packet and 
the position of the forwarding node's neighbors. So packets are delivered to the 
nodes in a particular geographic region in a natural way. There are different kinds 
of position-based protocols, which can be categorized into three main groups: 
Restricted Directional Flooding (RDF), greedy and hierarchical protocols [27] (to 
be discussed in Section 2). 
All the aforementioned position-based routing protocols are exposed to some 
attacks as they focus on improving performance while disregarding security issues 
[31]. Recently some secure unicast position-based routing protocols have been 
proposed for mobile Ad-Hoc networks; SPAAR [29], AODPR [31] and SGF [21]. 
This survey is a continuation of our work in [24] and [26]. Our previous works 
have discussed position-based routing in general. In this paper, however, we have 
concentrated mainly on security issues by providing an extensive overview of the 
existing secure position-based routing protocols for Ad-Hoc networks. We outline 
the main problems that need to be solved for this class of routing protocols and 
present the solutions that are currently available. The discussed protocols are also 
compared with respect to the security level they achieve, the used location service, 
the used forwarding strategy, tolerability to position inaccuracy, robustness, 
implementation complexity, scalability, packet and processing overhead, 
guaranteeing loop-freedom, probability of finding the shortest path as well as the 
suitable network density for deployment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic idea and 
principles of position-based routing. Section 3 tackles security issues and 
requirements in Ad-Hoc networks routing protocols. Section 4 gives an overview 
of the selected secure position-based routing protocols. Sections 5 and 6 contain a 
qualitative comparison as well as analysis and discussion of the presented 
protocols. Future research directions are outlined in Section 7. Finally, we 
conclude the paper in Section 8. 
2 Basic Principles of Position-based Routing 
An important requirement of position-based routing is for the source node to be 
able to obtain the current position of the destination node. Usually a location 
service is responsible for this task. Existing location services are classified 
according to how many nodes host the service. This can be either some specific 
nodes or all nodes of the network. Additionally, each location server may maintain 
the position of some specific or all nodes in the network. The four possible 
combinations can be summarized as some-for-some, some-for-all, all-for-some 
and all-for-all [27]. 
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Three main packet-forwarding strategies are used for position-based protocols: 
greedy forwarding, Restricted Directional Flooding (RDF) and hierarchical 
approaches. While their main objective is to utilize available position information 
in the Ad-Hoc routing, their means to achieve it are quite different. Most position-
based protocols (such as MFR, DIR, GPSR, ARP and I-PBBLR) use greedy 
forwarding to route packets from a source to the destination. Greedy protocols do 
not establish and maintain paths between sources and their destinations; instead, a 
source node includes the position of the data packet‟s destination and selects the 
next hop depending on the optimization criteria of the algorithm, the nearest 
neighbor to the destination for example. Each intermediate node selects a next hop 
node until the packet reaches the destination. In order for the nodes to be able to 
do so, they periodically broadcast small packets (called beacons) to announce their 
position and enable other nodes to maintain a 1-hop neighbor table. 
Some greedy position-based routing protocols, such as MFR, try to minimize the 
number of hops by selecting the node with the largest progress; i.e., the projection 
of the distance of the next hop from the sender on the straight line between the 
sender and the destination. Compass routing algorithms, such as DIR, try to 
minimize the spatial distance that a packet travels and base on forwarding the 
packet to the neighboring node that minimizes the angle between itself, the 
previous node and the destination. Whatever the used optimization criteria is, 
greedy forwarding is efficient, scalable and resilient to topology changes since it 
does not need routing discovery and maintenance. Greedy forwarding robustness 
is medium since the failure of an individual node may cause the loss of a packet in 
transit, but it does not require setting up a new route, as would be the case in 
topology-based Ad-Hoc routing. 
On the other hand, periodic beaconing creates lot of congestion in the network and 
consumes the nodes‟ energy [32]. While the beaconing frequency can be adapted 
to the degree of mobility, a fundamental problem of inaccurate (outdated) position 
information is always present; a neighbor selected as a next hop may no longer be 
in transmission range. This leads to a significant decrease in the packet delivery 
rate with increasing node mobility. To reduce the inaccuracy of position 
information, it is possible to increase the beaconing frequency. However, this 
increases the load on the network, creates lot of congestion, increases the 
probability of collision with data packets and consumes the nodes‟ energy [34]. 
Unfortunately, greedy routing may not always find the optimum route, and it may 
even fail to find a path between source and destination when one exists [21]. An 
example of this problem is shown in Fig. 1. The problem here is that S is closer to 
the destination D than any of the nodes in its transmission range; greedy 
forwarding will reach a local maximum even if there is a valid path from S to D. 
Generally, greedy forwarding works well in dense networks, but in sparse 
networks it fails due to voids; i.e., regions without nodes [11]. 
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Figure 1 
Greedy routing failure example 
Finally, DIR and any other method that includes forwarding a message to a 
neighbor with closest direction are not loop-free as shown in [17] using the 
counterexample in Fig. 2. In DIR the source or intermediate node A uses the 
location information of the destination D to calculate its direction. Then the 
message m is forwarded to the neighbor C, such that the direction AC is closest to 
the direction AD. Referring to Fig. 2 the loop consists of four nodes denoted S, B, 
C and A. The transmission radius is as indicated in the figure. Let the source be 
any node in the loop, e.g. S. Node S selects node B to forward the message, 
because the direction of B is closer to destination D than the direction of its other 
neighbor A. Similarly node B selects C, node C selects A, and node A selects S. 
 
Figure 2 
A loop in the directional routing 
In RDF, such as DREAM, LAR, LARWB and MLAR, the sender will broadcast the 
packet to all 1-hop neighbors towards the destination. The node which receives the 
packet checks whether it is within the set of nodes that should forward the packet 
(according to the used criteria). If yes, it will retransmit the packet. Otherwise, the 
packet will be dropped. In RDF, instead of selecting a single node as the next hop, 
several nodes participate in forwarding the packet in order to increase the 
probability of finding the shortest path and the robustness against a failure of 
individual nodes and position inaccuracy. On the other hand, they have higher 
communication complexity than greedy ones and, therefore, have less scalability 
to large networks. 
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The last forwarding strategy is to form a hierarchy in order to scale to a large 
number of mobile nodes. Some strategies combine nodes‟ locations and 
hierarchical network structures by using zone based routing such as LABAR. 
Others use dominating set routing such as GRID. Some others, such as 
TERMINODES, present a two level hierarchy within them; if the destination is 
close to the sender (in number of hops), packets will be routed base on a proactive 
distance vector. Greedy routing is used in long distance routing; as a result, they 
inherit some characteristics of greedy forwarding. 
We note that none of the above mentioned position-based routing protocols 
defined their security requirements and that they inherently trust all participants. 
Obviously, this could result in security vulnerabilities and exposures that could 
easily allow routing attacks. Recently, a limited work has been done to introduce 
some security issues to position-based routing protocols. Examples of these are 
Secure Position Aided Ad-Hoc Routing (SPAAR) [29], Anonymous On-Demand 
Position-based Routing in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (AODPR) [31] and Secure 
Geographic Forwarding (SGF) [21]. These protocols are discussed in details in 
Section 4. 
3 Security Issues in Ad-Hoc Routing Protocols 
Ad-Hoc network security, in particular routing protocols security, has attracted 
more attention recently. Securing Ad-Hoc routing faces many challenges, 
especially that each user brings to the network his/her own mobile unit, without 
any centralized control such as is found in a traditional network. In Ad-Hoc 
routing protocols, nodes exchange information with each other about the network 
topology, constructing a virtual view of the network topology to allow the routing 
of the data packet. This information allows them to create, delete and update 
routes between the nodes of the network. On the other hand, this capability can 
pose a security weak point in Ad-Hoc networks because a compromised node 
could give bad information to redirect traffic or simply stop it. Thus, this 
information must be protected to avoid malicious nodes disrupting the network 
[15]. 
Securing Ad-Hoc routing faces difficulties which do not exist in wired networks, 
nor in infrastructure-based wireless networks. These difficulties make trust 
establishment among nodes virtually impossible [4]. Among these difficulties are 
the wireless medium itself and its physical vulnerability, the lack of centralized 
control and permanent trust infrastructure, the cooperation of nodes, restricted 
power and resources, highly dynamic topology and short-lived connectivity and 
availability, implicit trust relationship between neighbors and other problems 
associated with wireless communication [4] [15]. 
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To ensure the security of Ad-Hoc networks, a number of requirements need to be 
satisfied. These requirements are availability, confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation [2] [6] [25]: 
 Availability: the network should remain operational and available to send and 
receive messages at any time. It is supposed to be robust enough to tolerate link 
failure and survive despite attacks. 
 Confidentiality: provides secrecy to sensitive data being sent over the network; 
the contents of every message can be understood only by its source and 
destination. Although an intruder might get hold of the data being sent, he 
should not be able to derive any useful information. 
 Integrity: ensures that messages being sent over the network are not corrupted 
by intentional or accidental modification. 
 Authentication: ensures the identity of the nodes in the network, to assure that 
they are who they claim to be. 
 Non-repudiation: guarantees that neither sender nor receiver can deny that he 
has sent or received the message. 
Recently, as privacy has emerged as an important security issue, plenty of work on 
anonymous routing has been done (such as ANODR [18], SDAR [1], ASRP [35], 
ODAR [9] and A3RP [20]). Anonymity in an Ad-Hoc routing means that the 
identity of node, route path information, and location information should be veiled 
from not only an adversary, but also other valid nodes. 
4 Secure Position-based Ad-Hoc Routing Protocols 
In this section the selected protocols are described. For each protocol, we tried to 
summarize its main objectives, the basic security mechanisms used, how it works 
and its advantages and disadvantages compared to other protocols. Additionally, a 
performance analysis is conducted, taking into consideration the following 
evaluation criteria: 
 Location service type: indicates the type of the location service used with the 
given protocol, i.e., shows how many nodes participate in providing location 
information and for how many other nodes each of these nodes maintains 
location information. 
 Location service robustness: it is considered to be low, medium or high 
depending on whether the position of a given node will be inaccessible upon the 
failure of a single node, the failure of a small subset of the nodes or the failure 
of all nodes, respectively. 
L. K. Qabajeh et al. Secure Unicast Position-based Routing Protocols for Ad-Hoc Networks 
 – 198 – 
 Approach: describes the fundamental strategy used for packet forwarding. 
 Tolerable position inaccuracy: forwarding strategies tolerate different degrees of 
inaccuracy of the position of the destination. This is reflected by the tolerable 
position inaccuracy criterion. 
 Robustness: the robustness of a particular protocol is considered as high if the 
failure (or absence due to mobility) of a single intermediate node does not 
prevent the packet from reaching its destination. It is medium if the failure of a 
single node might lead to the loss of the packet but does not require the set up of 
a new route. Finally, it is low if the failure of an individual node might result in 
packet loss and the setting up of a new route. Thus, the routing protocols that 
start data transmission immediately without routing setup have at least medium 
robustness. 
 Implementation complexity: describes how complex it is to implement and test 
a given forwarding strategy. This measure is highly subjective and we will 
explain our opinion while discussing each protocol. 
 Scalability: describes the performance of the protocol with an increasing 
number of nodes in the network. 
 Packet overhead: refers to bandwidth consumption due to larger packets and/or 
a higher number of signaling packets. The protocols can be classified as 
follows: Low overhead is used to describe protocols which have small packets 
and reduce the number of packets sent using unicast for example. Medium 
overhead is used to classify the protocols that have small packets but require 
large number of signaling packets, or if they require larger packets but use 
unicast to send the data. High overhead means that an approach requires larger 
packets as well as an increased number of signaling packets. Note that all 
position-based routing protocols have lower packet overhead compared to other 
types, but this criterion is defined to compare the discussed protocols together. 
 Processing overhead: is used to associate each protocol with the processing 
requirements. Low processing refers to approaches that require a low CPU 
processing. 
 Loop-freedom: any routing protocol should be inherently loop-free to preserve 
the network resources and guarantee the correct operation of the protocol. 
Therefore, the discussed protocols are classified as having or not having loop-
freedom property. 
 Optimal path: is used to indicate the protocol probability of finding and using 
the shortest path for data packet relay. 
 Density: indicates whether the protocol is more suitable to be implemented in 
dense or sparse networks. 
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4.1 SPAAR 
SPAAR uses position information in order to improve the efficiency and security 
of mobile Ad-Hoc networks. It was designed for protecting position information in 
managed-hostile environments where security is a primary concern and uses 
geographical information to make forwarding decisions, resulting in a significant 
reduction in the number of routing messages. SPAAR provides the necessary 
requirements to secure routing in a high-risk environment: authentication, non-
repudiation, confidentiality, and integrity. It uses asymmetric cryptography to 
protect against malicious nodes, which are unauthorized nodes that attempt to 
disrupt the network. Also it attempts to minimize the potential for damage of 
attacks from compromised nodes which are authorized nodes which have been 
overtaken by an adversary. 
Two of the well-known attacks are the invisible node attack and the wormhole 
attack. In the invisible node attack, a malicious node may forward a packet 
without appending its address to the address field of that packet. The wormhole 
attack involves the cooperation between two malicious nodes sharing a private 
communication. One attacker captures routing packets at one point of the network 
and tunnels them to another point in the network. The new attacker then 
selectively injects tunneled traffic back into the network. SPAAR prevents both 
the invisible node attack and the wormhole attack by allowing the nodes to accept 
routing messages only from 1-hop neighbors. 
To participate in SPAAR, each node requires a public/private key pair, a 
certificate binding its identity to its public key (signed by a Certificate Authority 
(CA) server), and the public key of that CA. Additionally, each node maintains 
two keys for each neighbor. The first is the neighbor‟s public key, which is 
obtained from its certificate and used to encrypt some routing messages such as 
Route REPly (RREP). The second is the neighbor's group decryption key, which is 
used to decrypt some routing messages such as Route REQuest (RREQ) to verify 
that the sender is a 1-hop neighbor. 
Each node periodically broadcasts a “table update” message to inform the 
neighbors about its new position coordinates and transmission range. Each node 
maintains a neighbor table that contains the identity and position information of 
each verified neighbor, as well as the cryptographic keys required for secure 
communication with each neighbor; the used location service is all-for-some. 
Additionally, each node maintains another table for the recent destinations it has 
communicated with. This table is similar to the neighbor table, except that the 
destination table also contains information about the speed of the node, making it 
possible to predict the node‟s next position. If this is the source node‟s first 
attempt at communication with a particular destination, the source may not have 
the destinations position. In this situation, a location service may be used. If no 
location service is available, a selective flooding algorithm may be used to reach 
the destination and receive its position information. 
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Route instantiation is triggered by the source through broadcasting a RREQ that is 
encrypted with its group encryption key. SPAAR uses a RREQ sequence number 
which is incremented each time a node initiates a RREQ and used to prevent 
replays of RREPs. RREQ recipients decrypt it with the appropriate group 
decryption key to verify that the sender of the RREQ is a 1-hop neighbor. The 
intermediate node checks if it or any of its neighbors is closer to destination; if so, 
it will encrypt the RREQ with its group encryption key, forward the RREQ and 
record the address of the predecessor neighbor; otherwise the RREQ is discarded. 
This process is repeated until the destination is reached. Upon receiving a RREQ, 
the destination constructs a RREP signed with its private key and encrypted with 
the public key of the neighbor it received the RREQ from. The RREP propagates 
along the reverse path of the RREQ, being verified at each hop. 
Intermediate nodes, upon receiving a RREP, decrypt it with their private key and 
verify the signature with the public key of the neighbor node they received it from. 
Then they sign the RREP and encrypt it with the public key of the next node in the 
reverse route. Upon receiving the RREP, the successful decryption and the 
signature verification, the source begins sending data. 
In SPAAR, each node maintains a neighbor table that contains the identity and 
position information of each verified neighbor; the used location service type is 
all-for-some. The source node can calculate the approximate geographic location 
of the destination from the most recent location and most recent velocity 
information stored in the source node‟s destination table. On the first attempt at 
communication with a particular destination, the source may use a location service 
or a selective flooding algorithm to reach the destination and receive its position 
information. The general robustness of this approach is medium, since the position 
of a node will become unavailable if a significant number of nodes fail. 
SPAAR uses the RDF, so it exhibits properties such as the high probability of 
using the optimal path. Moreover it is loop free since it forwards packets to nodes 
towards the destination and uses a sequence number. SPAAR tolerates position 
inaccuracy by the expected region; each node forwards the RREQ only if it, or any 
of its neighbors, is closer to the destination. Its robustness is low since the failure 
of an individual node might result in packet loss and the setting up of a new route. 
SPAAR has high implementation complexity since messages must be verified, 
signed with the private key and encrypted with the public key of a neighbor.  But 
it is still less complex than SGF since there is no reputation system. 
SPAAR assumes the existence of one certificate server, which may be the 
operation bottleneck especially in large networks. Also, increasing the number of 
nodes in the network with using RDF will increase the packet overhead. 
Additionally, in large area networks the probability of having long routes is 
increased, and since each node spends time in signing and encrypting the 
messages, the probability of nodes movement and routes breakage are also 
increased. For these three reasons, SPAAR‟s scalability is considered as medium. 
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Moreover, SPAAR has a high packet overhead due to large-size packets resulting 
from the security techniques used along with the increased number of packets 
compared to greedy forwarding. These security techniques lead also to high 
processing overhead. 
Finally, SPAAR can be implemented in both sparse and dense networks. It is 
suitable for sparse networks since it uses RDF, not greedy. Also, it is suitable for 
dense networks since increasing the number of neighbors will cause a larger 
neighbor table, but the computational overhead for the encryption of messages 
remains constant [29]. 
4.2 AODPR 
Due to the dynamic, infrastructure-less and broadcast nature of MANETs, 
communications in these networks are susceptible to malicious traffic analysis. As 
a following step, an attacker may determine a target node and conduct an intensive 
attack against it, called a target-oriented attack. AODPR keeps routing nodes 
anonymous, thereby preventing possible traffic analysis. A time variant temporary 
identifier is computed from the time and position of a node in an attempt to keep 
the node anonymous. Moreover, it uses the concept of Virtual Home Regions 
(VHR), which is a geographical region around a fixed center. In this scheme each 
node stays in one of the VHRs, and nodes within a VHR obtain their own 
geographic position through GPS and report their position information to Position 
Servers (PSs). 
When a node joins the network, it registers to the PS and gets a Common Key 
(CK) and a public/private key pair from the PS. When a node wants to get position 
information of other nodes, it first sends a signed request and authenticates itself 
to the PS; accordingly the PS provides it with the required position information, 
the public key of the destination and other needed information. Then the source 
estimates the minimum Number of Hop (NH) which the route request packet 
travels to find a route from the source to the destination. Each intermediate node 
decrements NH by 1 and compares the updated NH with the minimum number of 
hop which the route request packet travels to find a route from this node to the 
destination (NH‟). If NH‟ is less than or equal to NH, then the intermediate node 
forwards the packet to its neighbors and keeps the needed route information; 
otherwise it discards the packet. Both NH‟ and NH are calculated depending on 
the distance from the node to the destination and the radius of the maximum radio 
range coverage of each node. 
To improve the security of their protocol, the position of the destination is 
encrypted with CK in the route request phase; hence there is no position 
information exposure to nodes outside the intended network. After authenticating 
the sources, the destination replies by a route reply and keeps the route 
information to itself. Upon receiving the route reply and authenticating the 
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destination, the source begins sending the data encrypted by the destination‟s 
public key. If source receives a fail packet, then it tries again with a new, larger 
estimated NH. 
AODPR is robust against the wormhole attack in which an attacker records a 
packet in one location of the network and sends it to another location, making a 
tunnel; later it is retransmitted to the network under its control. Therefore, a packet 
might travel a long distance before finding the route from the source to the 
destination. In AODPR source nodes as well as intermediate nodes wait for a 
limited time to get a response. If the attacker response exceeds the limited time 
then it cannot be a forwarder within a routing path. So the effect of the wormhole 
attack is not effective in AODPR. 
Although the AODPR is applicable to any node density in a network, ensures the 
anonymity of both route and nodes, and is robust against the target-oriented attack 
[31], it suffers from many problems. Many fields such as NH and destination 
position are encrypted using the CK; if this key is compromised, a large 
percentage of the communication in the whole network will be compromised. 
Moreover, AODPR suffers from two problems inherited from the VHR approach. 
First, nodes may be hashed to a VHR distant from the one they are currently 
residing in, leading to increased communication and time complexity, as well as to 
problems if the VHR of a node cannot be reached. Second, since an Ad-Hoc 
network is dynamic, it might be difficult to guarantee that at least one position 
server will be present in a given VHR due to regions not including nodes. 
In AODPR each PS keeps the position information of the nodes that hashed into 
its VHR; hence, the used location service type is some-for-some. Accordingly, a 
given node will be inaccessible upon the failure of the PSs of its VHR; i.e., its 
location service has medium robustness. AODPR uses the RDF, so its probability 
of using the optimal path is high. Moreover it is loop-free since it depends on 
forwarding the packets to the nodes towards the destination and uses a sequence 
number. AODPR tolerates to position inaccuracy by using the expected region. Its 
robustness is low since the failure of an individual node might result in packet loss 
and the setting up of a new route. AODPR‟s implementation complexity is 
considered to be medium since messages are signed only with the private key of 
each node. So its complexity is less than SPAAR and SGF since it does not use 
neighbor public key or reputation system. 
AODPR has a medium scalability since increasing the number of nodes in the 
network with the usage of RDF will increase the packet overhead. However, it still 
has a higher scalability than SPAAR due to the reasons mentioned in the 
discussion of SRAAR scalability. AODPR also has less packet overhead 
compared to SRAAR. Even though the number of sent packets in AODPR is large, 
its packet size is smaller than that in SPAAR due to the later security techniques; 
AODPR is considered to have a medium packet overhead and processing 
overhead. Finally, AODPR is applicable to any node density in a network [31]. It 
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is suitable for sparse networks, since it uses RDF, as well as dense networks, since 
increasing the number of nodes will cause larger position information tables in the 
PSs without affecting computational overhead for encrypting messages. 
4.3 SGF 
In [21] the SGF mechanism was proposed. It provides source authentication, 
neighbor authentication and message integrity by using both the shared key and 
the Instant Key disclosure (TIK) protocol [36]. By combining SGF with the Grid 
Location Service (GLS) [19], they proposed the Secure Grid Location Service 
(SGLS) where any receiver can verify the correctness of location messages. In this 
paper also a Local Reputation System (LRS) is proposed to detect and isolate 
compromised as well as selfish users. 
The SGF mechanism incorporates both the hashed Message Authentication Code 
(MAC) [14] and the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication 
(TESLA) [3] with TIK protocol. The MAC is computed over the non-mutable part 
(e.g., the location information of a destination) of unicast messages with the pair-
wise shared secret key between the source and destination. 
Instead of introducing overhead by signing the destination‟s location information 
of all data and control messages, they proposed the use of a reputation system, 
LRS, to classify nodes as good or bad and to detect as well as isolate message 
tampering and dropping attackers. In LRS, each node only needs to manage the 
reputation information of its local neighbors and periodically send the reputation 
information report to its neighbors by using the HELLO messages. The TIK 
protocol with tight time synchronization is used to authenticate a previous 
forwarding node in order to prevent malicious users from joining a path and to 
avoid a message replay attack, re-sending recorded old valid control messages. 
Finally, when the destination receives a message, it can verify the authenticity of 
the message by comparing the received MAC to the MAC value that is computed 
over the received message with the secret key it shares with the source node. 
In combination with SGF, the secure location service, SGLS, was proposed by 
combining SGF with the GLS so that any receiver can verify the correctness of 
location messages. The original GLS is a distributed location service in which 
each node maintains information about the locations of specific subsets of the 
nodes based on the node‟s identifiers. GLS divides the area that contains a 
MANET into a hierarchy of squares. Each node periodically broadcasts the list of 
neighbors it has. Consequently, each node can maintain a table of immediate 
neighbors as well as each neighbor‟s neighbors. Each node enlists nodes with IDs 
„„close‟‟ to its own ID to serve as its Location Servers (LSs) by sending location 
update messages. 
The general concept of the proposed SGF can generally be applied to any unicast 
message of GLS such as location query and location reply. So the 1-hop 
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neighbor‟s location information can be verified by using a location verification 
technique, and the TIK protocol can be used for neighbor authentication. The 
TESLA broadcast authentication method is used to verify the location information 
of 2-hop neighboring nodes. Unlike other messages, the location update message 
has no assigned destination address field in it. Thus, it is unfeasible to provide 
source authentication with a symmetric secret key. Hence, a public key 
infrastructure is assumed in the MANET under consideration. Each node stores 
the trusted CA‟s public key and signs the location update message with its private 
key. 
The simulation results in [21] showed that SGLS can operate efficiently by using 
effective cryptographic mechanisms. Results also showed that LRS effectively 
detects and isolates message dropping attackers from the network. On the other 
hand, the simulations showed that the average end-to-end delay for SGLS is 
slightly higher than that of GLS, and that SGLS‟s routing overhead is significantly 
higher than that of GLS. This is obviously due to the increase in size of routing 
control messages with digital signatures and MACs in SGLS. 
Generally, systems using a reputation system along with a cryptography scheme in 
order to defend against both compromised and malicious nodes do not scale well 
since they have to track the reputation of all nodes, which might require huge 
tables of information that are difficult to manage and to keep up to date [10]. 
Moreover, SGF assumes the existence of pair-wise shared secret keys between the 
nodes, which is difficult to implement in large area networks. Another drawback is 
that SGF assumes all nodes have tightly synchronized clocks, which is somewhat 
impractical for Ad-Hoc networks. Finally, it uses the greedy forwarding, which is 
not guaranteed to find the optimal path. 
In SGF, each node should maintain a table of its immediate neighbors as well as 
each neighbor‟s neighbors [21]. So the used location service type is all-for-some. 
Accordingly, a given node will be inaccessible upon the failure of a subset of the 
nodes; the robustness of its location service is medium. SGF uses the greedy 
forwarding, so it exhibits some greedy properties such as uncertainty of using the 
optimal path. SGF robustness is medium since the failure of an individual node 
may cause the loss of a packet in transit, but it does not require setting up a new 
route. 
SGF tolerates to position inaccuracy by the list of neighbors HELLO messages 
that each node periodically broadcasts; each node knows the exact position of 
nodes in its transmission range and neighbors‟ transmission ranges. 
It is clear that it is very complex to implement SGF since it uses many securing 
techniques whether with the location service or the forwarding strategy. SGF 
assumes the existence of pair-wise shared secret keys between the nodes, which is 
difficult to implement in large area networks; so it has medium scalability. 
Moreover it has a high packet overhead due to the periodically sent reputation 
information report and the list of neighbors HELLO messages, in addition to the 
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large-size packets due to the security techniques used. These security techniques 
lead also to high processing overhead. SGF loop freedom depends on the used 
optimization criteria (directional or other). Finally, SGF is preferably implemented 
in moderate density networks, since greedy forwarding may have problems in 
sparse networks. On the other hand, implementing it in a dense network will 
increase the size of the periodic list of neighbors and reputation information 
HELLO messages, which may consume the network bandwidth and the nodes‟ 
memory. 
5 Comparison of Discussed Protocols 
Table 1 summarizes the discussed secure position-based protocols together with 
the security and performance evaluation criteria used. The three discussed 
protocols utilize position-based routing to achieve better performance than other 
topology-based ones while considering security issues and requirements. 
SPAAR provides the necessary requirements to secure routing in hostile 
environments by assuring authentication, non-repudiation, confidentiality and 
integrity. It uses asymmetric cryptography to protect against malicious and 
compromised nodes. SPAAR uses the RDF resulting in high probability of using 
optimal paths. Furthermore SPAAR is loop free due to forwarding packets to 
nodes towards the destination and using sequence numbers. It tolerates to position 
inaccuracy via the expected region; i.e., each node forwards the RREQ only if it or 
any of its neighbors is closer to the destination. Its robustness is considered as low 
since the failure of an individual node might result in packet loss and the setting 
up of a new route. The implementation complexity of SPAAR is high since 
messages must be verified, signed with the private key and encrypted with the 
public key of a neighbor. 
SPAAR is considered to have a medium scalability due to three reasons. SPAAR 
assumes the existence of a certificate server resulting in a system operation 
bottleneck, especially in large area networks. Moreover, increasing number of 
nodes, along with the use of RDF, results in high packet overhead. Finally, in 
large area networks, the probability of having long routes is high, and since each 
node spends time signing and encrypting routing messages, the probability of node 
movement and route breakage is increased. SPAAR has a high packet overhead 
due to large-size packets resulting from the security techniques used and an 
increased packets number compared to greedy forwarding. These security 
techniques result also in increased processing overhead. Lastly, SPAAR is suitable 
for implementing in both sparse and dense networks. It is suitable for sparse 
networks due to the usage of RDF. It is also suitable for dense networks since the 
increased number of neighbors causes a larger neighbor table but does not affect 
the computational overhead for message encryption. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of the presented secured position-based routing protocols 
Criterion SPAAR [29] AODPR [31]  SGF [21] 
Security 
mechanism 
Certificates and 
timestamps 
Symmetric and 
asymmetric cryptography 
and hash functions  
Symmetric and 
asymmetric cryptography 
and hashed MAC 
algorithm 
Synchronization  No   Yes  Yes 
Central trust  Certificate Authority  Key Distribution Center  Certificate Authority 
Main idea/ 
contribution  
Uses cryptographic 
certificates to protect 
routing packets in 
managed-hostile 
environments 
Keeps routing nodes 
anonymous to prevent 
possible traffic analysis 
and target-oriented attack  
Provides source 
authentication, neighbor 
authentication and 
message integrity 
Proposal • Intermediate node 
checks if it or any of its 
neighbors is closer to 
destination it encrypts 
RREQ with its group 
encryption key so that 
recipients can decrypt it 
with the appropriate 
group decryption key 
and verify that the sender 
is a 1-hop neighbor.  
• Intermediate nodes sign 
the RREP with its 
private key and encrypt 
it with the public key of 
the neighbor it received 
the RREQ from and 
verify the signature with 
the public key of the 
neighbor node it 
received the RREP from. 
• Uses VHRs; nodes‟ 
positions are reported to 
PSs. 
• Each intermediate node 
decides to broadcast the 
route request packet or 
not depending on the 
distance from the node to 
the destination and the 
radius of the maximum 
radio range coverage of 
each node.  
• Destination‟s position is 
encrypting with CK on 
the route request phase. 
• After authenticating the 
sources, the destination 
replies by a route reply.  
• Upon authenticating the 
route reply sender, 
source begins sending 
data encrypted by 
destination‟s public key. 
• Uses a reputation system 
to detect and isolate 
message tampering and 
dropping attackers as 
well as a secure location 
service to verify the 
correctness of location 
messages. 
• The MAC is computed 
over the destination‟s 
location with the pair-
wise shared secret key 
between source and 
destination to enable the 
destination to verify 
authenticity of message. 
• The TIK protocol is used 
to authenticate the 
predecessor and TESLA 
is used to verify the 
location information of 
2-hop neighboring 
nodes. 
Location service 
type 
All-for-Some Some-for-Some All-for-Some 
Location service 
robustness 
Medium Medium Medium 
Approach Restricted  directional  
flooding 
Restricted  directional  
flooding 
Greedy 
AODPR uses the RDF, resulting in a high probability of using the optimal path. 
Moreover, it is guaranteed to be loop-free since it depends on forwarding the 
packets to the nodes towards the destination and uses sequence numbers. AODPR 
tolerates to position inaccuracy by using the expected region. AODPR is robust 
against the wormhole attack and target-oriented attack. It is applicable to any node 
density and ensures routes and nodes anonymity. On the other hand, it suffers 
from numerous problems. For example, a large percentage of communication is 
done using the CK; hence it is a big concern to keep this key uncompromised. 
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AODPR‟s robustness is low since the failure of an individual node might result in 
packet loss and setting up a new route. In AODPR, messages are signed only with 
the private key of each node. Accordingly, its implementation complexity is less 
than SPAAR and SGF since it does not use neighbor public keys or a reputation 
system. AODPR has a medium scalability since increasing the number of nodes in 
the network with the usage of RDF increases the packet overhead. Even though 
the number of sent packets in AODPR is large, its packet size is smaller than that 
in SPAAR due to the later security techniques; AODPR is considered to have a 
medium packet overhead and processing overhead. 
SGF provides source authentication, neighbor authentication and message 
integrity by using both the shared key and the Instant Key disclosure. SGF 
tolerates to position inaccuracy by the list of neighbors HELLO messages that 
each node periodically broadcasts; hence each node knows the exact position of 
nodes in its transmission range and its neighbors‟ transmission ranges. 
It is clear that it is complex to implement SGF since it uses many securing 
techniques whether during the location service or the forwarding process. SGF 
assumes the existence of pair-wise shared secret keys among nodes, which is 
difficult to implement in large area networks; i.e., it has medium scalability. 
Moreover, it has high packet overhead due to the reputation reports and list of 
neighbors HELLO messages that are sent periodically, as well as to large-size 
packets due to the security techniques used. These security techniques result also 
in high processing overhead. SGF loop freedom depends on the used optimization 
criteria (directional or other). Finally, it is preferable to implement SGF in 
moderate density networks since greedy forwarding may have problems in sparse 
networks. On the other hand, implementing it in a dense network increases the size 
of the periodic list of neighbors and reputation information messages, which may 
consume the network‟s bandwidth and the nodes‟ memory. 
Table 1 
Characteristics of the presented secured position-based routing protocols (Continued) 
Criterion SPAAR [29] AODPR [31]  SGF [21] 
Tolerable position  
inaccuracy 
Expected Region Expected Region Transmission range and 
neighbors‟ transmission 
range 
Robustness Low Low Medium 
Implementation  
complexity 
High Medium High 
Scalability Medium Medium Medium 
Packet overhead High Medium High 
Processing 
overhead 
High Medium High 
Loop freedom Yes Yes Depends on optimization 
criteria 
Optimal path High High Medium 
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Density Both Both Moderate 
Advantages • Provides authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity 
and non-repudiation. 
• Provides high security 
level against malicious 
and compromised nodes 
as well as being robust 
against invisible node 
and wormhole attacks 
• Provides authentication, 
confidentiality and 
Anonymity. 
• Ensures the anonymity 
of both route and nodes 
and robust against the 
target-oriented and 
wormhole attacks  
• Provides authentication 
and integrity. 
• Effectively detects and 
isolates message 
dropping attackers from 
the network and robust 
against the replay attack 
Disadvantages • Requires the double of 
processing time, since it 
uses asymmetric 
cryptography, not only 
for end to end 
communication, but also 
for hop-to-hop 
communications 
• Suffers serious security 
problem if the CK is 
compromised. 
• Nodes may be hashed to 
a distant VHR leading to 
increased 
communication and time 
complexity and 
unreachable VHRs.  
• Has scalability problem 
due to assuming pair-
wise shared secret keys, 
assuming tightly 
synchronized nodes‟ 
clocks and tracking 
reputation of all nodes 
6 Analysis and Discussion 
The three presented protocols depend on position-based routing to achieve better 
performance compared to traditional topology-based ones while taking security 
issues into consideration. They aim to provide the necessary requirements to 
secure routing; however, they suffer from some problems limiting their scalability. 
SPAAR, for example, requires high processing time, since it uses asymmetric 
cryptography, not only for end to end communication, but also for hop-to-hop 
communications. SPAAR also has a centralized trust and so suffers from the 
compromised server problem and the single point of failure. 
AODPR uses a common key; if this key is compromised a large percentage of the 
communication in the whole network will be compromised. Moreover, it suffers 
from increased communication and time complexity if the nodes are hashed to a 
distant VHR, as well as if the VHR of a node cannot be reached. Additionally, due 
to nodes‟ movement, it might be difficult to guarantee that at least one position 
server will be present in a given Ad-Hoc network. SGF on the other hand suffers 
from high average end-to-end delay and packet overhead. Moreover, SGF assumes 
the existence of pair-wise shared secret keys between the nodes, which is difficult 
to implement in large area networks. Another drawback is that SGF assumes all 
nodes have tightly synchronized clocks, which is somewhat impractical for Ad-
Hoc networks. Finally, it uses the greedy forwarding, which is not guaranteed to 
find the optimal path. 
As a summary, even though the three discussed protocols try to improve 
performance and security, they suffer from several problems, such as single point 
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of failure and attack, along with high packet and processing overhead as in 
SPAAR and SGF; and sharing single key among all nodes as in AODPR, as well 
as assuming pair-wise shared secret keys and tightly synchronized nodes‟ clocks 
as in SGF. Consequently, these problems result in limiting the scalability of the 
discussed protocols. 
7 Directions of Future Research 
This paper has demonstrated that there are many approaches to be considered for 
position-based packet forwarding. Even so, there still exist a number of issues that 
need to be addressed. Position-based protocols make it possible to have larger 
networks without scalability problems. However, geographical routing also 
introduces new opportunities for attackers, especially given that most protocols 
broadcast position information in a clear form, which allows anyone within range 
to receive it. Hence, node position can be altered, making other nodes believe that 
it is in a different position. This could make other nodes believe that the attacker is 
the closest node to the destination and choose it as the best candidate for the next 
hop. 
Consequently, the attacker might be able to alter or drop the received packets. 
Thus, it is imperative that more intensive works be done for secure position-based 
routing protocols to defend against several attacks, not only from malicious nodes, 
but also from the compromised ones. Additionally, location privacy is one of the 
most major issues that needs to be addressed, since location privacy is hard to 
achieve when a node identifier can be immediately associated with its position. 
Alternative security schemes that are not based on infrastructure for key 
distribution should be considered, especially given that they suffer from high 
processing requirement (due to signing and signature verification of every packet) 
and may be a perfect target for Denial of Service (DoS), where attackers try to 
exhaust a node‟s processing time and battery through forcing them to spend time 
doing cryptographic calculations that are not required. Moreover, approaches that 
suggest the usage of symmetric cryptography suffer from a scalability problem 
since every pair of nodes would require a unique shared key. 
Geographical routing protocols depend heavily on the existence of secure 
distributed scalable location services which are able to provide the location of any 
host at any time throughout the entire network. Hence, researches should consider 
the security and scalability points upon developing a new location service. Finally, 
the most common way to enable nodes to know their locations is by equipping 
them with GPS. To decrease the cost and power consumption of small mobile 
nodes other techniques for finding relative coordinates should be discussed. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Efficient routing protocol is one of the most important issues in mobile Ad-Hoc 
wireless networks. Many points should be considered when developing a routing 
protocol, such as a high delivery rate, a short path, a small flooding ratio, a small 
end-to-end delay, low power consumption, a high level of security and avoiding 
single point of failure. This study has presented the current state of secure 
position-based Ad-Hoc routing and provided a qualitative evaluation of the 
presented approaches. Lastly, we identified a number of research opportunities 
which could lead to further improvements in this field. 
Position-based routing protocols use the geographical position of nodes to make 
routing decisions, which results in improving efficiency and performance. 
Forwarding techniques based on position information was classified into three 
distinct categories. Greedy routing does not require the maintenance of explicit 
routes; however, it works by forwarding a single copy of data packet towards the 
destination. Greedy packet forwarding is an efficient approach that scales well 
even with highly dynamic networks, and it is a promising strategy for general 
purpose position-based routing. However, it is not guaranteed to find the optimal 
path or it may not find a path at all. In RDF packets are broadcasted in the general 
direction of the destination. It was found that RDF protocols have better 
performance than greedy ones in term of finding the shortest path. Using 
hierarchical approaches increases the scalability of a routing protocol. This may 
be done through the usage of zone based routing, dominating sets or by means of a 
position-independent protocol at the local level and a greedy variant at the long-
distance level. 
Recently, security has gained attention in topology-based routing protocols and 
many attempts at proposing end-to-end security schemes have been made. 
However, it is clear that few research efforts have addressed position-based 
security issues. Even secure ones suffer from many problems. Some of these 
problems are single point of failure and attack, along with some problems 
regarding packet and processing overhead, as in SPAAR and SGF, sharing single 
key among all nodes as in AODPR as well as assuming pair-wise shared secret 
keys and tightly synchronized nodes‟ clocks as in SGF. Consequently, these 
problems result in limiting the scalability of the discussed protocols. 
Without online trusted servers, it is difficult to be aware of the trustworthiness of 
each node, thus to exclude malicious nodes from the routes. Furthermore, the 
approach in which one centralized server is used in the Ad-Hoc network is not 
practical as the server may be mobile, and result in operation bottlenecks as well 
as system single point of failure and attack. In order to address this problem, the 
position service system and the certificate authority should be distributed among 
multiple servers. Hence, it is an important issue to develop a scalable, distributed, 
secure and position-based routing protocol for Ad-Hoc networks. 
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